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  A Motion for Judicial Notice of the Record and Transcripts in State v.1
Richmond, No. 41093 will be filed with this brief.
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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case
Robert Richmond appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief.  Relief should be granted because the district court erred in
determining that trial counsel’s deficient performance at trial was not prejudicial
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
B. Procedural history
1.  The criminal case proceedings
Mr. Richmond was charged with aggravated assault against his fiancé,
Michelle Williams, “by punching her in the head and/or face causing severe swelling
and bruising to her eyes and face, and bleeding to her nose and/or by grabbing her
by the neck and applying pressure.”  (Criminal Case Record, p. 25 .)  Ms. Williams1
testified that Mr. Richmond was her ex-fiancé and that at the time of the incident in
this case she had been dating Mr. Richmond for about eight months.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.
156, ln. 4-24.)  She testified that on March 10, 2012, Mr. Richmond’s vehicle had
broken down and needed a new starter; they were in Garden City across from the
Ranch Club.  Mr. Richmond’s mother came to help but they could not get the vehicle
to start.  Eventually they jump-started the car.  Once Mr. Richmond’s mother left,
Ms. Williams and Mr. Richmond “starting arguing about him blaming me for him
staying here.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 158, ln. 1-9.)  Mr. Richmond wanted to move away, and,
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according to Ms. Williams, he blamed her for him staying in Idaho.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.
158, ln. 24-25.)
Once the car was jump-started, Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams drove
toward Mr. Richmond’s mother’s house in Meridian.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 158, ln. 14-15.) 
According to Ms. Williams, during the drive, Mr. Richmond was yelling at her about
keeping him in Idaho and was calling her names.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 159, ln. 7-12.)  Ms.
Williams testified that at this point Mr. Richmond hit her on the side of her head,
causing her head to hit the windshield.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 160, ln. 12-18.)  He continued
to punch her in the eyes and the nose.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 160, ln. 20-23.)  
At this point, Ms. Williams stated that she went in and out of consciousness. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 161, ln. 1-2.)  She denied ever trying to hit him back or scratch Mr.
Richmond.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 161, ln. 19-23.)  Eventually, according to Ms. Williams, Mr.
Richmond took the seat belt and choked her with it.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 162, ln. 19-23.) 
Ms. Williams testified that she lost consciousness after Mr. Richmond choked her. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 163, ln. 20-21.)  However, she told the responding paramedic that she
never lost consciousness.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 211, ln. 9-11.)  
Mr. Richmond eventually stopped the vehicle at the residence, where,
according to Ms. Williams, Mr. Richmond “pulled me out and ripped my shirt and
my sweatshirt and my bra completely off me.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 164, ln. 13-16.) 
At this point Ms. Williams went to a neighbor’s house and asked them to drive her
to a bar because her friends were there.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 165, ln. 13-19.)  She had a
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shot of whiskey and a beer at the bar and then went to two other bars.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.
166, ln. 8-23.)  She had also been drinking prior to the drive from Garden City to
Meridian.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 169, ln. 2-7.)  A bartender called the police after Ms.
Williams asked her to.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 167, ln. 1-2.)  Ms. Williams did not call the
police because she loved Mr. Richmond and did not want him to get in trouble.  (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 167, ln. 11-18.)  She never went to the hospital or saw a doctor.  (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 191, ln. 18-22.)
Mr. Richmond testified and denied that he and Ms. Williams had fought
about him staying in Idaho; Mr. Richmond testified that he found employment in
San Diego and that Ms. Williams “was more than prepared to go.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.
264, ln. 2-8.)  According to Mr. Richmond, things started to go “downhill” shortly
after they crossed the intersection of Eagle and Chinden.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 272, ln.
6-11.)  Ms. Williams began to discuss how upset she was that she was leaving her
family, but she was also talking about her father because she had a bad dream the
night before.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 272, ln. 8-16.)  Her father had molested her as a child. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 159, ln. 10-12.)  Ms. Williams seemed to be working herself up a bit
and Mr. Richmond thought that perhaps she had too much to drink.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.
274, ln. 2-9.)  He also was not sure that she had taken her PTSD medicine and he
knew she was prone to temper tantrums when she forgets to take the medicine.  (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 274, ln. 10-25.)
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Ms. Williams began getting upset with Mr. Richmond because she did not
think he was paying attention or taking her seriously.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 275, ln. 9-19.) 
She then hit Mr. Richmond in the arm, but not very hard.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 278, ln.
2-15.)  Mr. Richmond testified that at this point they stopped at a friend’s house
because Ms. Williams wanted marijuana.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 278, ln. 14-25.)  However,
the friend was not at home and Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams continued toward
Meridian.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 279, ln. 2-5.)
After Mr. Richmond merged into traffic, Ms. Williams punched him on the
side of his head and insisted that they go back to the friend’s house and try again. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 280, ln. 20 – p. 281, ln. 5.)  Mr. Richmond refused and Ms. Williams
then punched him again, causing his head to snap back and his glasses to fall off. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 281, ln. 14-24.)  He realized at this point that the vehicle was moving
into oncoming traffic and he was stunned.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 282, ln. 6-25.)
At this point, Mr. Richmond pulled the vehicle over and told Ms. Williams to
exit.  (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 283, ln. 3-17.)  She refused to exit but promised to calm down. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 284, ln. 2-15.)  Shortly thereafter, however, she “reached out and she
grabbed me by my shirt sleeve and pulled me forward and she started pummeling
me.  She started hitting me on the side of the head and face, and I was putting my
hand up to block her from hitting me.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 286, ln. 14-21.)  Mr. Richmond
realized he was then driving in a construction area and then into oncoming traffic,
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so, “there was nothing else that I could do at that particular point, so I started to
fight back.”  (Tr. Vol. I., p. 287, ln. 1-15.)  
Mr. Richmond testified that he “reverse punched her,” and “we were kind of
swinging wildly back and forth.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 287, ln. 17-25.)  Mr. Richmond stated
that the struggle only lasted a few seconds and that, after landing a couple of
punches, he felt Ms. Williams stop punching him.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 288, ln. 22-25.)  
At this point, he used, “an up-and-under move,” where, “I went over her shoulder
and went under her elbow and grabbed her by her sweatshirt and pushed her
sweatshirt back over as I was leaning on the car this way pushing her back into the
seat.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 289, ln. 5-11.)  Ms. Williams continued to push forward toward
him and he continued to push back; they continued pushing each other until Mr.
Richmond pulled into the driveway, where he told Ms. Williams he was going to let
her go.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 291, ln. 1-19.)  He let her go and jumped out of the vehicle. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 291, ln. 16-25.)  
Afterward, Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams spoke for about 10-15 minutes;
he noticed that her nose was bleeding and her eye was swelling.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 292,
ln. 8-25.)  At this point it dawned on Mr. Richmond that Ms. Williams had forgotten
to take her medication and thought that this might explain her behavior.  (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 292, ln. 17 – p. 293, ln. 4.)
Mr. Richmond felt awful about what happened.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 293, ln. 4-7.) 
He testified that he did not feel in imminent danger of bodily harm the first time
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that Ms. Williams began hitting him but did the second time – “I thought that we
could probably get into a really bad accident at that point when I saw the car
coming toward us.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 293, ln. 15-19.)  He believed that his actions were
necessary to prevent the two of them from crashing.  (Tr. Vol. I, p. 294, ln. 1-7.)
Mr. Richmond was found guilty of aggravated assault.  (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90, ln.
21-25.)  He subsequently pleaded guilty to a persistent violator enhancement.  (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 96, ln. 13-23.).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of nine
years, with two years fixed. (Crim. R, p. 137.)  Mr. Richmond then appealed.  (Crim,
R., p. 150.)
2.  The direct appeal
On appeal, Mr. Richmond argued, inter alia, that the jury instruction on self-
defense was erroneous because it required that he prove he was in imminent danger
of “death or great bodily harm,” the standard in homicide cases, instead of the lesser
standard of “bodily harm” applicable in other cases.  His trial attorney did not object
to that instruction.  The state conceded and the Court of Appeals agreed the
instruction was erroneous.  However, the Court found that the instructional error
was not fundamental error under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961
(2010), reasoning that:
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not
require the State to disprove a defendant’s affirmative defense. See
Martin [v. Ohio], 480 U.S. [228,] 236 [(1987)]. Therefore, contrary to
Richmond’s assertion, there is no violation of the United States
Constitution when the jury is improperly instructed on the affirmative
defense of self-defense. Because Richmond does not argue that the
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Idaho Constitution requires, as a guarantee of due process, that the
State disprove a defendant’s affirmative defense, Richmond has not
demonstrated that the erroneous jury instruction violated one of his
unwaived constitutional rights.
State v. Richmond, No. 41093, 2014 WL 4345808, at *3 (Ct. App. 2014).  Rejecting
Mr. Richmond’s other arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.  Id.,
at *7.
3.  The post-conviction proceedings
Mr. Richmond filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  (R 5.)  He
alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in the manner that she argued the self-
defense theory of the case and by failing to object to the erroneous self-defense
instruction.  He alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that the Idaho Constitution’s due process protections require the state to disprove
an affirmative defense.  (R 6.)
The state filed an Answer, but failed to attach the “portions of the record
material to the questions raised in the application,” as required by I.C. § 19-4906(a).
(R 23-26.)  Counsel was appointed to assist Mr. Richmond.  (R 29.)  An Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed.  (R 56.)  The Amended Petition alleged
that trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland because she failed to object to the
erroneous self-defense instruction.  (R 56-57.)
The state filed an Answer. (R 67.)  It also filed a motion for the Court to take
judicial notice of documents from the criminal case, including the reporter’s
transcript of the jury trial.  (R 71.)  It later filed a Supplemental Motion for the
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Court to Take Judicial Notice and attached copies of the criminal trial transcripts
and other documents, including the Judgment of Conviction.  (R 90-91.)  Mr.
Richmond also filed a Motion for the Court to Take Judicial Notice.  (R 91.)  The
court orally granted all these motions.  (Post-Conviction Transcript “PC T” p. 7, ln.
9-11.)
The state filed a Motion for Summary Disposition.  (R 74.)  In support of its
motion, the state argued that trial counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous motion
was not deficient performance.  (R 81.)  It continued by contending that Mr.
Richmond also had not established the prejudice prong of Strickland. (R 82-83.)  Mr.
Richmond responded by arguing that there was enough evidence in the record to
require an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Strickland prejudice.  (R 101.)  At the
hearing on the state’s motion, however, Mr. Richmond’s counsel agreed that the
evidence in the record was sufficient for the court to determine the case on its
merits.  (PC T pg. 8, ln. 11-14.)  At the hearing, the parties disagreed over whether
Strickland prejudice had been shown.  (PC T pg. 19, ln 10-19; pg. 25, ln. 6-10.)
The court dismissed the petition.  It found that trial counsel’s performance, in
failing to object to the erroneous self-defense jury instruction, was deficient
performance.  R 598.  However, it found that Mr. Richmond had not shown that he
was prejudiced thereby and dismissed the petition.  (R 599-600; 602.)
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed.  (R 603.)
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III.  ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did Mr. Richmond establish that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
deficient performance?
IV.  ARGUMENT
Mr. Richmond demonstrated prejudice under Strickland.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d
1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient, and
that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 688 (1984).
To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the
attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).  To establish prejudice, the
applicant must show a that, but for the attorney’s deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability of a different result.  Id.
Both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry
are mixed questions of law and fact.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698
(1984).   “Because mixed questions of law and fact are primarily questions of law,
this Court exercises free review.”  Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d
663, 668 (2008), citing The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 69, 936 P.2d
10
1309, 1311 (1997).
Here, the court erred in finding Mr. Richmond had not shown prejudice.  Mr.
Richmond’s sole defense in this case was self-defense.  He testified that Ms.
Williams became irate and began punching him and he responded by punching her
back in order to make her stop.  He also testified that she pushed herself into him,
causing him to lose control of the vehicle for a time and causing him to move into
oncoming traffic.  It was in response to this pushing that Mr. Richmond used the
“up and over” move, which Ms. Williams described as using the seatbelt to strangle
her.  
The jury instruction required a finding that Mr. Richmond be faced with an
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.  (R 95-96.)  However, a finding of
simple bodily injury was sufficient.  The jury could have easily concluded that Ms.
Williams’ conduct did not create a fear of imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury, but could have concluded that the simple act of either punching or pushing
Mr. Richmond placed him in fear of some bodily injury.  Thus, it could have
concluded that Mr. Richmond feared bodily injury but not imminent danger of death
or great bodily injury and still convicted him of aggravated assault.  This was error
and undermines the reliability of the verdict and the confidence in the outcome of
the proceedings.  And because this error goes to the heart of Mr. Richmond’s
defense, there is a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted.
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V.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Richmond asks this Court to vacate the
dismissal of his petition and remand the matter so that judgment in his favor may
be granted.    
Respectfully submitted this 8  day of September, 2016.th
   /s/ Dennis Benjamin                     
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Robert Richmond
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